DIY Kiesling-Shpilkin diagram
The presentation of a new interactive tool
Good news for electoral observers, journalists and researchers. You have got a new and long-awaited tool, the interactive Kiesling-Shpilkin diagram.
For the first time, the number of abnormal votes can be determined by anybody, and the number can be different for each and every person.
But that's not all. Now you have at your disposal a whole set of interconnected tools for studying elections, which includes 4 versions of the Kiesling-Shpilkin diagram, both scatterplots, two High-Resolution Histogram builders and two Geographical-Administrative diagrams. This remarkable kit is accompanied by a couple of useful tables.
This detailed video tutorial will help you understand how to work with this kit, what the advantages of an integrated approach are, how the tools help each other to detect an anomaly, or how the data from one instrument confirms the data from another.
Of course, from the video, you will learn how to build the famous diagram yourself.
We'll also entertain you with a laboratory work on the Moscow region, where you can:
- explore four ways to find an honest PECs zone
- at your liking, calculate the number of anomalous votes in favour of the governor of the Moscow region in the range from 100 thousand to one and a half million
- unravel the old mystery of the peaks at the integer percentages of the results of the candidates from the "party of power"
- see with your own eyes the blood-chilling scene in which three hundred cancelled ballot papers came back to life, grew their chopped-off corners and joined the army of Mr Governor's supporters. And all this is observed in completely official data!
- using the interactive reference table, solve the dispute between two electoral investigators
- and even take a peek into the recent elections in Yerevan (Armenia) to envy the fair and hard-fought electoral struggle.
All elections of the regional leaders of Russia in 2023 have been loaded into the complex tool. Namely, elections in the republics of Sakha (Yakutia) and the Republic of Khakassia, in the Smolensk, Omsk, Samara, Nizhny Novgorod, Orel, Novosibirsk, Ivanovo, Pskov, Voronezh, Kemerovo, Amur, Tyumen, Magadan and Moscow regions, in the Altai, Krasnoyarsk and Primorsky Territories, in the Chukotka Autonomous District and in the city of Moscow.
You can explore all of these elections at the following link: integrated tools for gubernatorial elections in EDG-2023.
You will be able to detect anomalies in the turnout dynamics with the help of another unique tool, with the working name "turnout-scope": the Analyser of Turnout Dynamics, specially produced by us for EDG-2023. The tool allowed us to detect falsifications in the Far East, Moscow Region, and a number of other regions on the very first day of voting! It was possible to do this even before the official voting results were published. This is another of its unique features: it works on preliminary turnout reports, which commissions are used to falsify with impunity since we had not had such a tool before.
In the tutorial, we discovered falsifications in the Moscow region. You can reproduce this investigation and see the anomalies for yourself with the integrated tool for the 2023 Moscow region gubernatorial election.
You can study the Yerevan Elder Council elections, which we used for comparison, by following the links: 2017, 2018, 2023.
The electoral data of all the elections from this article has been uploaded into
the Lab . Now, you can see the elections with your own eyes™.
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